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ANALYSING LEADERSHIP IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
Sophie Harman and Simon Rushton 
 
Abstract 
Rhetoric around the need for more and better leadership is everywhere in contemporary 
global health governance, yet there has been little articulation of what type of leadership is 
required, who might play leadership roles, and in what fora leadership might be exercised. 
Global health governance has widely been seen as a policy space characterised by a 
multiplicity of (often competing) actors with no overall authority. Yet despite this things 
do ‘get done’, and in some cases there are impressive levels of collective action to address 
particular health problems. We argue that leadership provides an important lens for 
understanding how things do (or do not) get done in global health governance. Drawing 
on the existing literatures on global health governance and leadership and agency in 
international relations, we set out in this paper a framework for analysing leadership in 
global health governance. Crucially, we argue, such a framework must be specific enough 
to be operationalisable in terms of a program of research and at the same time broad 
enough to capture a wide variety of different sources, sites and forms of leadership – 
including the roles played by ‘hidden leaders’ who are seldom acknowledged in mainstream 
analyses of global health politics. 
 
Sophie Harman is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen 
Mary University of London, UK. 
 
Simon Rushton is a Faculty Research Fellow in the Department of Politics at the University of 
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Introduction 
Global health governance continues to be subject to regular calls for reform. Demands for changes 
in the institutional architecture, greater co-ordination between the myriad agencies involved, and 
closer partnership between public and private actors are commonplace in contemporary global 
health discourse. A recurring theme in these discussions has been the apparent need for more (and 
better) leadership. Leadership rhetoric, indeed, is everywhere: at the international level it is seen as 
vital to the ongoing project of WHO reform;1 at the national level as a key factor in developing 
countries delivering effective health policies and programmes.2  Yet whilst more and better 
leadership is commonly seen as the solution to these problems and a host of others, there is little 
articulation of what type of leadership is required, who might play leadership roles, and in what 
fora leadership might be exercised.  Instead leadership has taken on the status of an unattainable 
panacea, its absence being both an explanation and an excuse for the overall system’s failure to 
adequately address health needs. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we explore the analytical utility of ‘leadership’ 
as a lens through which to examine global health politics, in particular its value in helping to reveal 
how things ‘get done’ in global health (or, in too many cases, why they don’t). Second, we seek to 
operationalize leadership as means of analysing global health politics, in doing so arguing that 
existing work on agency and leadership in International Relations (IR) can provide us with some 
of the conceptual tools we need to understand leadership in global health. The paper argues that 
a focus on leadership delivers some revealing insights into the practice of health governance, not 
least around the setting of global health agendas. However, such an approach also brings dangers 
– in particular the risk of reifying the roles played by prominent (and often self-proclaimed) ‘global 
health leaders’ (the vast majority of whom are white men from the Global North), in so doing 
obscuring the roles played those who do not fit this image of who a leader is, or how and where 
he (or, less frequently, she) should act. To guard against this danger we propose a maximalist 
conceptualisation of both ‘leadership’ and ‘global health governance’ which first understands 
leadership as a practice rather than as a position to be held and retained; and which secondly takes 
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a broad view of where leadership in global health is practiced, looking beyond the traditional ‘policy 
hubs’ of Geneva, New York, Washington DC and Seattle, and instead viewing global health as a 
genuinely global governance arena. 
The paper proceeds in four sections. In the first we explore what existing studies of global 
health governance tell us about agency. In the second section the paper goes on to consider what 
we know about leadership as a particular form of agency in global health governance, arguing that 
whilst there are some insights to be gleaned, leadership has not to date received sufficient analytical 
attention. In the third section, we suggest that work outside of global health has some important 
lessons to offer, in particular the literature on agency in IR, and also the existing work on leadership 
in supra-national negotiation processes. Finally, building upon the literatures examined in the 
preceding sections, the paper proposes a five-part matrix for analysing leadership in global health 
governance which is sensitive to the varied forms, sites and sources of leadership which exist in 
practice. 
 
Agency and global health governance 
Scholars in global health have done a good job of mapping and describing the developing and 
highly complex ‘architecture’ of global health governance in which agency (in the sense of the 
ability to create change) is highly diffused. We have good accounts of the variety of actors that 
play governance roles, of the ways in which new actors have entered this policy sphere over the 
last couple of decades, and of some of the material and ideational forces that have shaped global 
health governance. For instance, we know quite a lot about the characteristics, approaches and 
activities of most of the major global health governance actors, including the WHO,3 the UN,4 the 
World Bank,5 the IMF,6 the WTO,7 NGOs,8 public-private partnerships,9 and old and new forms 
of philanthropy10 - not to mention the role of states in the contemporary globalisation of health 
policy.11 There have also been a number of works that have looked across global health governance 
as a field and have tried to understand how the pieces of this complicated jigsaw fit together.12  
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It would clearly be impossible to summarize the whole literature within one short paper, 
but it is possible to draw out three findings about the forms and sources of agency in global health 
governance which are commonly identified. 
The first – certainly not unique to the health sphere – is that money talks. The ability to 
finance global health projects and institutions is a key source of agency, not least through the ability 
to dictate how that finance is used. Perhaps the best example of financial resources being a source 
of agency in global health is that of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Famed in global health 
circles for having a larger budget than the WHO, the Foundation’s Global Health Program has 
exhibited tremendous influence with regard to its ability to finance activities and institutions 
directly, influence agendas, and secure a presence in high-level global health summits and the 
World Health Assembly. It is true that attributing this agency solely to finance is a simplification - 
the personal profile and gravitas of Bill Gates himself (as well as Melinda) also plays a part, as does 
the reputation of the experts who work with and for the Foundation - but it is the Foundation’s 
ability to put its financial muscle behind those issues that it prioritises (inextricably linked to those 
issues in which Bill and Melinda have a personal interest) that has made it one of the most powerful 
and influential non-state actors in global health governance.13 More traditional international 
financing organizations such as the World Bank are also able to exercise agency as a consequence 
of their ability to mobilise funds, in the case of the Bank through core International Development 
Agency (IDA) or International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) project funds 
as well as multi-donor trust funds for specific health priorities. Again, the World Bank’s agency 
cannot be attributed solely to its ability to financially support specific health projects. The fact that 
it has a long-standing country presence and well-developed relationships with both governments 
and United Nations agencies in-country also gives it tremendous influence.14 Thus though the 
Bank may not always bring the most money to the health table, its combination of finance, in-
country longevity and proximity to government provide a unique source of agency in global health.  
Conversely, a reliance on external finance can seriously inhibit an actor’s ability to exercise 
agency. The cuts to the WHO’s core budget, for example, have been widely seen as having reduced 
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its scope to exercise agency in global health.15 The institution continues to be able to articulate 
health needs, concerns and priorities but often lacks the necessary finance to support work in 
specific areas or to carry out the initiatives that it might wish to pursue (unless it can persuade 
governments to support them through Extra-Budgetary Funds). Even the organization’s ‘softer’ 
normative role seems to be under threat as the lack of funds impacts on its knowledge production 
capacity, and the range and scope of its activities comes under increasing scrutiny from its funders, 
some of whom desire a narrower, more technically-focussed and less politicized WHO. 
A second agency-related finding to be drawn from studies on global health governance is 
a tendency for new institutions to be created when existing ones are thought to be failing, for 
whatever reason. From the turn of the millennium, global health has seen a rapid and sprawling 
growth of new multilateral institutions, non-governmental organisations, public-private 
partnerships and product development partnerships. Some of these, such as the Global Fund - 
which was intended to fulfil a gap in rapid financing to combat ‘the three scourges’ of HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and tuberculosis - were created specifically because of a belief that existing institutions 
such as the WHO, UNDP, or the World Bank were not capable of delivering effectively.16 
Elsewhere new organizations have grown up in response to the availability of funding in particular 
areas, a phenomenon seen most clearly around HIV/AIDS. This was certainly the case with the 
growth of the NGO industry in countries where the disease had high prevalence and was targeted 
for international financial assistance.17  
Again, such emphasis on “the new” can restrict the space in which the incumbent 
institutions of global health, such as the WHO, can exercise agency. Some see this as a good thing, 
as the WHO is forced to compete with other agencies and address some of the problems that 
people see with the institution. On the other hand, it plays into the idea that the WHO is a failing 
institution, reducing the space the organization has to act on its mandate and its potential to exhibit 
the agency it is often accused of lacking, creating a vicious circle of underachievement and under-
valuation.  
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The increasing number of institutions has also divided the overall ‘global health pot’ 
between a greater number of actors. During the early years of global health’s institutional boom 
this was less of a problem as it coincided with a dramatic increase in overall funding for global 
health. Partnerships such as the Global Fund and GAVI were created and given large budgets with 
which to work. Now, however, budgets are tightening, and there seems to be a reduction in the 
rate of institutional creation. Those that have already been created, however, are presumably here 
to stay. As a result, global health actors are increasingly being forced to compete with each other 
to maintain (let alone increase) their funding levels.  
The third finding we distil from the global health governance literature is that the 
bewilderingly complex, ad hoc and non-hierarchical institutional architecture has created 
problems. In terms of setting a consistent and deliverable global health agenda the problem, 
arguably, is a surfeit rather than a lack of agency. This is particularly evident with regard to 
overlapping mandates, competing aims and objectives, and double-dipping in the pot of project 
financing. Multiple initiatives have been established over the last 10-15 years in an attempt to co-
ordinate the work of different global health actors. These include donor partnership groups or 
meetings; principles such as the ‘three ones’ articulated by UNAIDS to co-ordinate the global 
AIDS response in-country; technical working groups; the designation of lead agencies in specific 
sectors; and major global agreements such as the Paris Declaration. However despite the range 
and number of initiatives – which in themselves demonstrate how multiple mechanisms of co-
ordination can also complicate the problem further – problems of overlap and ‘mandate creep’ 
abound. The multiplicity of actors also imposes significant transaction costs, not least on recipient 
countries. Such countries have to manage the different interests, objectives and demands of their 
numerous ‘partners’, a task that can stretch already under-resourced government capacity and can 
lead to a shifting of priorities towards those health issues seen as popular or appealing to external 
donors. Whilst it could be argued that the existence of multiple donors can actually enhance the 
agency of developing countries as they have an opportunity to play different donors and different 
tranches of aid financing off against each other, in practice such complexity frequently generates 
7 
 
a management headache for governments and can contribute to a distortion of priorities of an 
individual state’s health objectives. 
These three agency-related issues – the link between finance and agency; the creation of 
new institutions; and the potential for too much (and too often uncoordinated) agency - have 
intersected with underlying structural factors to present a number of challenges to contemporary 
global health politics. Global inequalities (both economic and heath inequalities, the two of which 
are closely linked) have not been tackled. The need to address the social determinants of health 
has been the subject of much rhetoric, but far less concrete action. The global financial crisis is 
also having an impact on global health. ODA for health is starting to drop as other areas such as 
infrastructure begin to grow, some donors have withdrawn from partnerships such as the Global 
Fund, and a perception of ‘aid fatigue’ amongst the wider public is growing, particularly with regard 
to diseases such as HIV/AIDS, challenging the assumption that global health financing will always 
feature highly in the public conscience. This is all occurring at a time when the position of health 
in international development financing is being discussed in the context of the 2015 Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) deadline. Three of the eight original MDGs were health-related, and 
much of the investment in global health over the first decade of the new millennium was driven 
by that commitment. Questions remain, however, over the extent and scope of health’s 
representation on the post-2015 development agenda. The fact that global health is susceptible to 
being portrayed as bloated, with multiple (and at times competing) actors increases the danger that 
it may find itself slipping down the list of priorities.  
Whilst these three insights are commonly found across the existing literature on global 
health governance, another thing that characterises the vast majority of these works is a tendency 
to take institutions (or partnerships between institutions) as the principle agents of global health 
governance. As a result, the agency of individuals working both within and outside of these 
institutions is often overlooked. This corporatist approach to institutional agency has the merit of 
simplifying the analysis of what is, even in simplified form, an overwhelmingly complex policy 
space. At the same time, however, it brackets off much of what we know about the practice of 
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institutional politics – for example that bureaucrats can wield power and authority,18 that 
personalities (and inter-personal group dynamics) contribute to determining political outcomes,19 
and that institutions do not always behave in a coherent fashion – nor do they necessarily behave 
in the ways their creators intended.20 A focus which privileges institutions and their ‘outputs’, 
therefore, risks undervaluing the processes through which those outputs are produced – as a 
consequence missing some important determinants of how things ‘get done’ in global health 
governance. A focus on individuals and their exercise of leadership, we argue, has much to 
contribute here. 
 
Leadership in global health 
Where scholars have examined individual agency, they have exhibited a strong tendency to 
focus on particular types of individual - predominantly white, Western and male - who have, 
according to mainstream accounts, shaped and led the current discourses and practices of global 
health. There have, for example, been a number of studies of individuals who head (or hold other 
senior positions in) global health institutions, including individuals such John D Rockefeller,21 Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, Lee Jong-Wook,22 Bill Gates,23 Jonathan Mann,24 and Peter Piot.25 We also 
know about the ways in which high-profile celebrities such as Bono have aligned themselves to 
global health issues. Senior politicians have also attracted attention as individual agents capable of 
shaping global health. George W. Bush, for example, played a widely-noted leadership role in the 
scale-up of anti-retroviral treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS (as well as supporting 
prevention strategies) through his President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).  
In some cases these leaders have been widely praised for their influence on global health 
as a policy field. Jonathan Mann, for example, has been credited with a crucial role in the 
development of global responses to AIDS, and in particular with promoting a human rights-based 
approach to AIDS and other health issues. Elsewhere, judgements on the leadership of particular 
individuals have been more mixed. Bill Gates has been the subject of criticism in some quarters 
despite his foundation’s huge investment in global health. Perhaps more predictably, George W. 
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Bush has divided opinion. Whilst PEPFAR is seen by many as a key part of the effort to achieve 
universal access to ARVs, the leadership Bush demonstrated was not without controversy. 
Prevention programmes were originally funded on the condition that the ‘C’ of ABC – Abstain, 
Be faithful, use a Condom – was not used. PEPFAR programmes were also subject to the ‘global 
gag rule’ (repealed by Obama in 2009) that prevented US aid from going to any organisation that 
provided or offered services related to termination of pregnancy, and only organisations and 
groups that explicitly opposed prostitution would be eligible for funds.26 These conditions led to 
considerable consternation among parts of the global health community, particularly among those 
working on reproductive health and women’s health. 
Similar controversies have arisen around political leaders who have deliberately attempted 
to challenge the status quo. The ex-Minister of Health for Indonesia, Siti Fadilha Supari is a prime 
example. In seeking to challenge the global virus sharing system that is a fundamental part of 
influenza vaccine production, Supari was seen by some as playing a leadership role on behalf of 
the developing world in contesting a system which resulted in many of the countries supplying 
virus samples (including Indonesia) in effect being priced out of purchasing the vaccines that those 
samples were used to produce. Others, however, saw Supari’s tactic of withholding virus samples 
as highly problematic. Even some of those who supported her point in principle were uneasy about 
the tactic of effectively ‘holding the world to ransom’ through the refusal to share samples.27 
Leadership, these examples show, is often controversial and – despite the rhetoric which 
presents leadership as a solution to global health ills – it is not necessarily an unproblematic good. 
But whilst scrutiny of the roles of such high-profile figures as Supari, Bush, Gates and Mann is an 
important part of analysing global health politics, it is far from the whole story. Indeed, we argue 
here that the focus on these high-profile figures draws attention away from the less obvious 
‘hidden leaders’ who also play instrumental roles in creating and implementing global health 
programmes, subverting or reinforcing global agendas, and shaping the outcomes of policy 
discussions in a range of different countries and contexts.  
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 Partly this shortcoming is a result of the spaces and fora in which we generally think of 
global heath as being governed. High profile conferences and summits generate attention around 
particular types of leaders, but not around those who do not attend such events (may not even 
have not heard of such events), or attend but do not have a prominent role in plenary sessions and 
press conferences. Likewise, the clustering of global health institutions in Geneva (and New York, 
Washington DC, London and Seattle), reinforces a particular view of who is governing global 
health and where that governance is happening. These spaces and the agents who operate within 
them are of course important and should not be ignored. Yet one of the key insights of the first 
generation of scholars of ‘global governance’ was that governance happens everywhere. James 
Rosenau, for example, wrote in the first issue of the journal Global Governance that 
 
The United Nations system and national governments are surely central to the conduct of 
global governance, but they are only part of the full picture. Or at least in this analysis 
global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity -
from the family to the international organization - in which the pursuit of goals through 
the exercise of control has transnational repercussions. The reason for this broad 
formulation is simple: in an ever more interdependent world where what happens in one 
corner or at one level may have consequences for what occurs at every other corner and 
level, it seems a mistake to adhere to a narrow definition in which only formal institutions 
at the national and international levels are considered relevant.28 
 
But whilst the global health governance literature has clearly (and often explicitly29) built upon the 
thinking of Rosenau and others on global governance, it has too rarely taken up the challenge to 
see what is happening in the more obscure corners and at the less high-profile levels.  
There are, however, some notable exceptions. Sanjoy Bhattacharya’s detailed historical 
work on Smallpox eradication in India, for example, highlights how Indian health workers and 
research partners were pivotal to the disease’s global eradication. As Bhattacharya argues, “it would 
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be simplistic to reduce the worldwide smallpox eradication programme to the ideas and actions of 
a handful of individuals or, indeed, the institutions to which they were associated.”30 Yet, as he 
also highlights, this is what has often happened, with the contributions of those operating at the 
national and sub-national levels (especially within the developing world) often being neglected in 
accounts of the history of smallpox that have tended to reify individuals working with Western 
institutions such as CDC.31 As Bhattacharya notes, 
 
it is no surprise to witness organised eﬀorts on the part of government and nongovernment 
agencies to highlight their contributions to this memorable triumph. The danger, of course, 
is that these exercises will chronicle relatively few voices and then present them as being 
representative of the “reality” of the eradication programme as a whole; such an approach 
is to be avoided, although these individual voices are, of course, valuable. The global 
project to limit the spread of variola, as it evolved in the 1960s and 1970s, involved 
countless participants. It was simultaneously an international and local entity, and each 
avatar had several constituents.32  
 
The lesson we take from the work of Bhattacharya (and others who have sought to reveal the 
activities of what we here term ‘hidden leaders’) is that understanding how things ‘get done’ in 
global health (or, to use the language of leadership studies, how the agency of multiple actors can 
be harnessed in pursuit of common goals) requires us to take into account both high-profile ‘visible’ 
leaders and often-ignored ‘hidden’ leaders. Failing to take both into account risks providing a 
skewed picture of how global health governance works, and also brings the other problems we 
noted above in relation to the reification of a particular type of (usually white, Western, male) 
leader. This, it seems to us, runs counter to the whole idea of health (and health governance) as 
‘global’. A key requirement for the analytical matrix that we present in the final section of the 
paper, therefore, is that it must provide a means of examining the influence of both visible and 
hidden leaders in global health politics.  
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Agency and leadership in International Relations 
 First, however, we look beyond the global health governance literature to examine what 
insights from other fields might provide conceptual tools that can contribute to the building of a 
framework for the analysis of global health leadership. This involves, in particular, understanding 
agency in at the international level and then understanding leadership as a particular form of 
individual agency. 
 
Agency  
Any understanding of leadership in the international sphere has to be based on an 
underlying conception of agency. Questions of agency are one of the central pillars of IR 
scholarship. Historically, discussions of agency in mainstream IR tended to focus on states as 
actors. The discipline’s primary interest in the inter-state level of analysis made this in many ways 
a natural choice: states go to war, states sign treaties; states create international organizations; and 
states adopt foreign policy positions. Of course, as David Williams argues,33 such ‘black-boxing’ 
of the state – the US gives money to HIV/AIDS; the UK prioritises maternal child health – is 
generally recognised even by those who perpetuate it as a form of intellectual ‘shorthand’. Yet the 
use of such a shorthand is nevertheless seen by many IR theorists as defensible, even desirable. 
For Kenneth Waltz, for example, states were the fundamental units within the international system. 
The properties, characteristics and make-up of those units did not matter much in his system-level 
approach to theorising international politics; only the position of units within the system 
mattered.34 Individual human agency was less important to Waltz’s system-level theorising because 
personalities and behaviours can change whereas structures of the state and the system in which 
states operates endure: ‘abstracting from attributes of units means leaving aside questions about 
the kinds of political leaders, social, and economic institutions and ideological commitments states 
may have.’35 Alexander Wendt, coming from a very different theoretical position, argues that 
agency can ultimately only be attributed to individual persons, although he goes on to make the 
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case that states acting within the social environment of international society can be treated as 
analogous to individuals and understood as persons with moral roles and responsibilities as well 
as legal and judicial claims to sovereignty.36 
 It would be wrong, however, to portray IR’s engagement with agency as lacking in nuance: 
even amongst those who see states as the primary agents, it is certainly true that there have been 
important and influential debates and a growing interest in the question of ‘who governs’.37 Two 
examples are the agency-structure problem/debate/problematique and work that has examined 
the question of which states are able to exercise agency on the international level. The former 
debate, which essentially arose from the perceived failure of structure-driven (often structural 
realist) accounts of international politics to deal with major changes such as the end of the Cold 
War, resulted in new theorising about the relationship between agency and structure, and to 
disagreements over the relative weight that should be given to each in explaining political 
outcomes. The latter stream of work has used the concept of agency as a normative framing for 
investigation bringing ‘peripheral’ states often seen as subject to, not agents in, international 
relations to the fore. This has particularly been the case with regard to African agency.38 African 
states have often been seen as something exceptional - not really states in the western conception 
of the term. Despite the fact that they are a politically and socially diverse set of polities, the history 
of colonialism has tended to lump African states into one (problematic) category. Emphasising 
agency as a lens through which to investigate African states’ roles in international relations, such 
work seeks to overcome the idea of Africa being ‘acted upon’ by the international system rather 
than African people, states, and collective endeavours acting in their own right.39  
 As we go on to discuss further below, leadership is something that is practiced by 
individuals – an idea which makes it problematic to apply these traditional ideas about agency in 
IR. Elsewhere, however, IR scholars have looked at individual agency. For example, Colin Wight, 
contra-Wendt, argues that a personification of the state which treats states as “individuals writ 
large” obscures individual human agency within the state. As Wight says, ‘this seems to be little 
different from previous forms of structuralism that essentially write out individuals and treat them 
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as ciphers for structural forces’ leaving little room for individual agency and an assumption on the 
sources of collective agency that gives states the space to act.40 Whilst this is a fair critique of some 
of the system-level theorising of Wendt (and indeed of Waltz and others) there is, of course, also 
a long history of ‘looking inside the state’ to understand ‘what makes them tick’, from Graham 
Allison’s classic Essence of Decision41 to today’s work on foreign policy analysis. 
There has also been a good deal of work that has examined individual human agency 
outside the context of the state. Indeed there is a widespread acknowledgement amongst most IR 
theorists that states are not the only significant actors in contemporary international politics, even 
if some continue to prioritise states in their analysis. One example of such work is the literature 
that has examined individual agency within international institutional structures, perhaps most 
notably within international organizations. Robert Cox’s essay on the ‘executive head’42 was a 
classic statement of this kind, and it has been followed by a literature that has examined the 
bureaucracies of international organisations and how those bureaucracies can exercise agency both 
corporately and through the actions of individuals within them43 – including literatures examining 
the holders of specific positions such as the UN Secretary-General as actors in world politics 
capable of exercising significant degrees of agency.44 Work on civil society’s role in international 
relations has also paid attention to the role of individuals, including celebrities and other high-
profile actors.45  
 
Notwithstanding the discussions over who or what has agency, there has been relatively 
little conceptual examination of what ‘agency’ in the international sphere actually means – 
especially when compared to the emphasis that the discipline has placed on understanding 
‘structure.’46 As Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously said of hard-core pornography, 
there is a sense that we all know agency when we see it, even if it is rarely actually defined. Colin 
Wight, however, proposes a conceptualisation of agency that is ‘multi-layered’ and that “explicates 
the fragmented nature of this problematic concept.”47 In doing so he attempts to avoid falling into 
what he sees as the trap of personifying the state by taking into account three ‘levels’ of agency: 
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agency as the capacity to (intentionally) do something (which Wight calls agency1); agency in the 
sense that those with the capacity to do something are acting as ‘agents’ of something other 
principal (agency2, which locates agents within a particular socio-cultural context); the third level 
(agency3) describing “‘position-practice-places’ which agents1 inhabit on behalf of agents2.”
48 
Wight’s attempt to clarify this through an example runs as follows: 
 
An example of the way in which these three levels of agency are complexly related to each 
other can be drawn from an examination of the nature of a diplomat. X, our putative 
diplomat, is at once an agent1, he has a unique personality which is itself a consequence of 
his unique personal make-up and the many forms of agency2 and agency3 which have 
shaped and formed X throughout his life. Nonetheless, at a given point in time X assumes 
a specific ‘positioned-place-practice’ within one of the realms of agency2 (the diplomatic 
service) which X inhabits. This ‘positioned-place-practice’ delineates the function that X 
now plays in this particular form of agency2. Yet X, due to his potential as an agent1 – and 
his participation in differing forms of agency2 – is never an automaton simply practising in 
accordance with his place in the positioning.49  
 
Leadership  
Getting to grips with understanding different levels of agency, the role of individuals in 
the international sphere, and the relationship between individual agents and the states or other 
bodies on whose behalf they act is crucial for our purposes because, as Oran Young agued, 
leadership is inherently an activity carried out by individual human beings. He noted (with some 
clear echoes of the quote from Wight above) that 
 
the recent emphasis on hegemony and, more generally, structural determinants of 
collective outcomes in international society has had the effect of diverting attention from 
the roles that individuals play as leaders who are able to exercise significant influence over 
16 
 
processes of institutional bargaining. To avoid the resultant pitfalls of reification, it is 
important to bear in mind the relationship between individuals and collective entities, such 
as states and international organizations. Those who become leaders in institutional 
bargaining frequently act in the name of or as agents of states or international 
organizations. But in the final analysis, leaders are individuals, and it is the behavior of 
these individuals which we must explore to evaluate the role of leadership in the formation 
of international institutions.50  
 
But even if we accept the basic premise that leadership is practiced by individuals, there are still 
plenty of conceptual difficulties in applying leadership as a concept. Leadership Studies has 
struggled for decades to define and agree on the use of the term. Fleischman et al51 identified 65 
different classification systems that had been developed at that point, and there remain divides at 
the most fundamental levels, including over whether leadership is about the shaping of a group 
process; whether it is a trait that individuals either do or do not possess; or whether it is a particular 
form of behaviour.52  
 Each of these understandings has been evident in the long history of works on political 
leadership, which long pre-date the recognition of any formal discipline of ‘leadership studies’. For 
a long time ‘big man’ theories of the charismatic political leader dominated. Over time, however, 
there has developed a literature of more direct relevance to the study of global health governance 
which has sought to understand the broader and more nuanced role of leadership (and associated 
phenomena, such as policy entrepreneurship) in policy processes,53 including in supra-national 
settings. This literature has often foregrounded the roles played by individuals (at least, as we shall 
see, by particular types of individual).  
 Oran Young made a helpful distinction between ‘structural leaders’ (who are “experts in 
translating the possession of material resources into bargaining leverage”); ‘entrepreneurial leaders’ 
(who rely on “negotiating skill” to make agreement possible); and ‘intellectual leaders’ (who rely 
on “the power of ideas to shape the thinking of the principles”). All of these forms of leadership, 
17 
 
Young argues, play a role in the reaching of international agreements.54 As to the identities of those 
leaders, Young argues that structural leaders “are almost always representatives of major actors 
involved in bargaining processes”, but that those who exercise the other forms of leadership can 
be far more diverse: he cites, for example, scientists who helped shape global action on ozone 
depletion,55 whilst other have examined those who hold formal leadership positions, such as chairs 
of negotiations.56 
 Here, in the context of international negotiations, leadership is essentially being 
understood as a social process in which leaders (using whichever form of leadership) attempt to 
influence those (usually states) who have the power to either agree or not with a particular 
negotiated outcome. The aim of leadership, therefore, is to bring multiple actors together around 
a common goal.  The means by which the different kinds of leaders Young identifies seek to create 
that convergence of opinion vary – using resources as leverage (structural leadership); using 
persuasion and bargaining tactics (entrepreneurial leadership); and using ideas to shape the way in 
which participants understand the issue and their own interests (intellectual leadership). In each 
case, however, the overall aim is to bring the various parties involved in a negotiation to agreement.  
For our purposes – attempting to better understand how things ‘get done’ in global health 
governance– a similar understanding of leadership as a process of harnessing the agency of 
multiple actors best provides us with the tools that we require. Indeed the definition of leadership 
that we adopt here is simple (although in some ways deceptively simple): following Northouse57 
we define leadership as “a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to 
achieve a common goal”. We also stress (and discuss further below) that it is important to take 
into account the fact that such influence takes place in a specific context, place or setting. Others 
who have grappled with the issue of leadership in international politics have often settled upon 
similar definitions - Joseph Nye for example, describes leadership as “mobilizing people for a 
purpose.”58  
There are, however, two remaining (linked) hurdles to operationalising the idea of 
leadership in relation to global health. The first is that there is more to global health governance 
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than formal negotiations. To be sure there are formal international negotiations over health issues, 
but governance processes are much more diverse than this: individual organizations have their 
own policies; non-state actors play important governance roles; national governments (and sub-
national entities) make decisions and undertake actions that have international consequences; and 
a conglomeration of individuals shape or subvert practices of global health in the implementation 
and interpretation of policy directives and ideas. Understanding how things ‘get done’ also requires 
us to look at policy implementation, not just policy making. So Young’s work – and that of a 
number of others who have also focussed on formal negotiation processes59 - gives us some useful 
tools, but addresses only part of the picture. 
Second, and following on from this, even Young’s diverse group of intellectual leaders 
(including renowned scientists and others who might be able to influence international 
negotiations) does not cover the breadth of those that we include in our category of ‘hidden 
leaders’, many of whom would have no access to international negotiations but who nevertheless 
play a role in the governance of global health. As we noted above, accounts of agency and 
leadership in global health have tended to focus on organisations – international institutions or 
community based organisations for example – or prominent leaders that fit a particular mould. 
However we argue that ‘hidden leaders’ play a fundamental role in getting things done in global 
health that whilst not prominent in mainstream accounts of global health policy show clear 
leadership in engaging followers and mobilising around global health issues – just as with the 
Indian health workers and others in Bhattacharya’s history of smallpox eradication. 
 
An analytical model for investigating leadership in Global Health Governance 
In outlining an analytical model for investigating leadership in global health governance we 
build on the insights to be derived from the works of Young, Wight and others, but use them in a 
way which is at once specific enough to be operationalisable in terms of a program of research and 
at the same time broad enough to capture a wide variety of different sources, sites and forms of 
leadership. Our starting point is that that we can best understand ‘leadership’ in the international 
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sphere as a specific form of agency. But whilst it is individual human beings who actually exercise 
leadership, they will be doing so within the particular context of their role (‘positioned-practice-
place’ in Wight’s terminology) and often on behalf of a principal (for example they will be acting 
as a representative of a particular state, international organization, NGO or affected community). 
As Wight reminds us, however, their individual characteristics as an agent1 with particular life 
experiences and histories will also matter.  
Given the number of institutions that play global health governance roles at all levels, and 
the huge number of people involved in them, individual agency is obviously a hugely widespread 
phenomenon involving many thousands of individuals across the world. Leadership (at least 
successful leadership) is, however, a more limited phenomenon. Leadership requires the individual 
agent to be pursuing a particular purpose (related to global health), and it also requires intent – a 
conscious effort on the part of an agent to turn other agents into followers. Who these leaders are 
in practice is an empirical question – but one which is, we argue, ‘researchable’ through applying 
the matrix we set out below to particular areas of global health governance (for example, to 
examine leadership around a particular disease or policy). 
The identity of leaders’ (intended) followers is another empirical question, but there are 
some general things that we can say. And here things become even more complex because there 
are multiple forms of individual and collective agents that leaders may wish to influence: 
governments; publics; philanthropists; private corporations; international organizations – and the 
list could go on. What unites these putative followers is that they must also possess agency (either 
individual or collective). Thus the goal of a leader in the context of global governance is to harness 
the efforts of multiple agents in pursuit of a common goal. Why some leaders succeed and some fail in 
harnessing the efforts of multiple agents – what determines their success or failure - is yet again 
an empirical question. There are, however, indications in the literature about some of the factors 
that may contribute to successful leadership including power, charisma, the existence of a 
conducive external environment60 and the ability of leaders to successfully adapt their message to 
the social context.  
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The logic underpinning our belief in the utility of leadership as an analytical concept is, 
briefly stated, this: global health governance has widely been seen as a policy space characterised 
by a multiplicity of (often competing) actors with no overall authority capable of setting, still less 
enforcing, a coherent agenda. Yet despite this things do ‘get done’ in global health governance, 
and in some cases there are impressive levels of collective action designed to address particular 
health problems. Such things do not emerge by chance. Leadership, we argue, is one of the key 
factors in the harnessing of multiple agents to produce such collective action outcomes.  
Of course, it is also the case that structure and not just agency matters. Leaders are agents 
acting within (and constituted by, as well as constituting) a particular structure. The study of 
leadership must therefore incorporate this broader context and recognise that “individual 
leadership approaches in conjunction with contextual and situational approaches are indispensable 
for understanding causality in international relations and comparative politics today.”61 To 
understand leadership, therefore we propose an analytical model that proceeds from the insights 
of Wight, Young and others but which takes into consideration the need to recognise hidden 
leaders, which is sensitive to structure and which connects leadership to specific outcomes – 
desired or otherwise. As such we propose five analytical points on which leadership can be analysed 
with global health: i) position-presence; ii) intent; iii) context; iv); form and v) outcome. 
 
A Five-Point Matrix for Analysis 
 
1. Identity and positionality. The first question concerns who is exercising leadership around a 
particular health issue, policy etc. and (where relevant) on whose behalf they are exercising 
that agency (e.g. is it as a representative of a state, an NGO or something else). The ability 
of particular individuals to exercise effective leadership is of course shaped by this 
positionality, but also by a wide variety of other factors including geography, personal 
wealth, expertise, cultural relations and chance. As Bill Gates Sr (father of Bill Gates) has 
pointed out, Bill Gates would not have become Bill Gates if he had been born in a 
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developing country.62 However that is not to say that if Bill Gates had been born in 
Tanzania he could not have exhibited leadership; he may not have established Microsoft 
or his Foundation, but he could still have mobilised the people around him in pursuit of a 
specific outcome. Such an outcome may not have had comparable world-wide coverage 
or impact but it would remain a position and context specific outcome that may have 
impact given his position and presence. Hence even though identity and positionality are 
crucial in understanding the constraints on leadership, they should be used to reveal rather 
than obscure different forms, sources and sites of leadership.  
Methodologically speaking, there is clearly a challenge to be addressed in identifying 
those who are exercising ‘hidden leadership’. If they are hidden, how can we find them? 
Whilst it is important not to underestimate this difficulty, our contention is that it is one 
that can be addressed, and that designing research in a way that is sensitive to the 
existence of hidden leaders can enable their governance contributions to be brought out 
into the open (subject to the caveats we address below about the necessity of leaders 
remaining hidden in some political contexts). Careful empirical tracing of particular 
policy making and implementation processes is, we would argue, the key to identifying 
hidden leaders and tracing their contribution. Bhattacharya, whose work on Smallpox 
eradication we discussed earlier, serves as a model here: beginning with an awareness that 
events in Geneva and Atlanta cannot explain everything about the ultimate success of the 
global Smallpox eradication campaign leads to a project design that combines what is 
happening at the global level to a careful empirical analysis of what is happening at the 
national and sub-national level, in the process revealing a whole new set of agents who 
are playing important (leadership) roles. The challenge for those working in global health 
governance, therefore, is to expand their horizons beyond the traditional ‘policy hubs’ 
and to better engage empirically with global health governance on a more genuinely 
global basis.  
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2. Intent. Once leaders have been identified, the issue of their intent can be investigated. 
Questions here include why they took on a leadership role around a particular issue, what 
their motives were, how these activities fitted with their professional commitments and 
roles, and how they strategized about the ways to forward a particular agenda and to create 
followership. Institutions and actors are often keen to take the credit for various successes 
in global health and distance themselves from perceived failures. To match leadership 
between individuals or institutions and outcomes it is therefore crucial to map original 
intent: this requires not just an analysis of an actor’s retrospective intent, but a 
historiographical tracing of their key positions and actions, partnerships and alliances with 
regard to a specific health outcome.  
 
3. Context: Leadership is subject to the context in which it takes place. The political, social, 
economic and temporal context defines how leadership operates and how (and whether) 
it produces specific outcomes. Take two examples. First a leader that mobilises resources 
for health concern X in a time of economic boom may be seen as an effective leader in 
resource mobilisation, whereas a leader that fails to generate income or protect jobs in a 
specific sector during a time of economic austerity may be seen to fail. Second a leader 
wants to roll out vaccination against disease Y. However, the community in which they 
work distrust the vaccine and the vaccinators, a thought echoed by the opposition 
government of the time. A leader who is successful in implementing the programme and 
mobilising support for it may be seen as effective in generating a beneficial output for 
global health. A leader who decides that this is not what the community wants and uses 
the resources for other health endeavours may also be seen as effective for responding to 
the community’s wants and the political context of the country even though the public 
health objective has not been met. In both examples the leaders can be labelled ‘effective’ 
depending on the context in which they work and who does the labelling. Therefore in 
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each scenario of analysing leadership, context determines what is seen as 
effective/successful and by whom and crucially as well, who is deemed ineffective and 
why.  
Context also shapes explanations as to why a leader may be hidden. A leader may be hidden 
because they operate at a level that means they go unnoticed.  However, they may be 
deliberately hidden because of the context in which they are working. To be a leader, of 
course, means being visible – at least to the audience one is trying to persuade. Yet some 
leaders may deliberately hide from certain parts of society (such as their government) so 
as to maintain the work that they do or protect the interests of the community they 
serve.For example, a leader in Polio vaccination in Karachi, Pakistan may deliberately be 
hidden from groups that distrust and target vaccination workers but may still display a 
leadership role in mobilising workers and support among other key populations within the 
area. Hence context is not only about outcomes but is also about why a specific leader is 
hidden and whether their desire is to remain hidden. This is important to both how we 
understand leadership in global health but also how we design methodologies (and how 
we publish findings) that are sensitive to the contextual constraints and opportunities to 
such leadership. 
 
4. Form. Form is perhaps the area in which most studies of leadership cluster, often with 
regard to how to be a better leader. For our purposes, form should not reveal how to do 
or improve leadership but necessitates a focus on the different types, skills and mechanisms 
of leadership used at multiple levels. As noted above, Young identified a number of 
different forms of leadership (structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual). Better 
understanding of which form of leadership particular leaders use, and which are influential 
in particular governance processes, could shed significant light on the way in which things 
‘get done’ in global health governance, and on which sources and techniques are 
particularly influential within this governance arena. A focus on the form of leadership 
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exhibited by hidden leaders is once again of crucial importance here; leadership means 
different things to different people and is context specific, thus the form leadership takes 
should be shaped to these contexts and positions. It is hidden forms of leadership and the 
context in which such leadership takes place that is often overlooked or ignored yet hold 
the most revealing insight into how global health policies work or fail. 
 
5. Outcome. The final part of the matrix for analysing leadership is to trace the contribution of 
the leader to a particular political outcome. Outcomes can be a failed, partial or full 
realisation of intent. Although we present outcomes last (as it would be in the 
chronological exercise of leadership)  in practice this may be the starting point for research 
into a particular case study, with an outcome representing a point from which to trace back 
the identity/positionality, intent, context and form of leadership involved in producing 
that outcome. 
 
Conclusion 
Global health governance is marked by an abundance of agents. However, what is frequently 
lacking in the current understanding of governance processes in global health is how individual 
agency impacts upon (and translates into) governance outcomes – raising such questions as who 
is exercising leadership; why; how; where; and with what effects. This paper has argued for a more 
holistic examination of the role of leadership in influencing a group of agents to come together in 
pursuit of common global health goals. This, it seems to us, is crucial to understanding how things 
‘get done’ (and why they don’t) in a governance context as diverse and uncoordinated as that which 
we see in global health. Important in this is the investigation of the leadership that happening 
beyond the (western) hubs of global health activity.  
 A focus on leadership at multiple levels and different contexts matters for three reasons. 
First locating leadership beyond the global health hubs of presumed decision-making we can begin 
to fully globalise global health by expanding our critical lens to account for the individual agents 
25 
 
mobilising political will and support for a number of different global health outcomes that are 
unseen when taking a global – i.e. institutional - perspective. Second, a focus on hidden leaders 
enhances understanding of the challenges, limits and opportunities to the delivery and local 
formation of a number of global health priorities and how such agency can undermine, reshape, 
or heighten specific health outcomes. In other words, we can begin to unravel how things get done 
both within and beyond the elite in global health. Finally, consideration of hidden leaders will help 
identify any mismatch between context and intent in global health policy. In this regard context is 
the most challenging and central component of the five point matrix for leadership outlined in this 
paper.  
We propose that any account of leadership has to be drawn from a full understanding of 
agency that transcends the idea that states and institutions (predominantly western based states 
and institutions) are the agents of global governance, to account for individual intent and action 
that is position- and context- specific. In doing so, studies on global health can begin to take fuller 
account of the hidden leaders that in practice exhibit considerable leverage and leadership in global 
health. Frequently it is these hidden leaders that get things done, subvert or enact wider forms of 
leadership and that reinforce or challenge ideas of what the global health agenda should look like. 
But whilst such a broad view of agency in global health governance seems normatively desirable, 
it does pose challenges for researchers. This paper has proposed an analytical framework for 
understanding leadership based on five points of analysis: i) identity/positionality; ii) intent; iii) 
form; iv); context and v) outcome. 
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